Steel Coils, Inc. v. M/V Lake Marion United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 331 F.3d 422 (Decided May 31, 2003) by Frank M. Jenkins \u2704
Admiralty Practicum 
Volume 2003 
Issue 2 Fall 2003 Article 2 
February 2018 
Steel Coils, Inc. v. M/V Lake Marion United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 331 F.3d 422 (Decided May 31, 2003) 
Frank M. Jenkins '04 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank M. Jenkins '04 (2003) "Steel Coils, Inc. v. M/V Lake Marion United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit 331 F.3d 422 (Decided May 31, 2003)," Admiralty Practicum: Vol. 2003 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum/vol2003/iss2/2 
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ADMIRALTY PRACTICUM 
ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
ADMIRALTY LAW SOCIETY 
FALL 2003 
Published biannually by the Admiralty Law Society of St. John's University School of Law to bring to the 
attention of practitioners and other interested persons the highlights of recent court decisions in the 
admiralty field. The case summaries presented herein may not discuss all issues addressed by the various 
courts. Therefore, readers are advised to consult original case sources. 
COGSA LIABILITY AND RELATED DEFENSES 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment 
holding that cargo was loaded undamaged and that notations indicating certain 
minor flaws in the bill of lading were within the customary usage for the cargo in 
question. Additionally, the Court held that "peril of the sea" defense is not available 
solely upon a showing of turbulent conditions; a carrier's duty to exercise due 
diligence is non-delegable; and the package limitation is not available in an action 
against a carrier's agent. 
Steel Coils, Inc. v. MN Lake Marion 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
331 F.3d 422 
(Decided May 3 1 ,  2003) 
Plaintiff, Steel Coils, Inc. ("Steel Coils"), entered into a voyage charter with 
Western Bulk Carriers ("Western Bulk") for the MIV Lake Marion ("vessel") to import 
flat-rolled steel from Russia to the United States. Western Bulk had time chartered the 
vessel from Lake Marion, Inc. ("Lake Marion"). Bay Ocean Management ("Bay 
Ocean"), acting as the manager of Lake Marion, employed the master and crew of the 
vessel in accordance with the time charter agreement. 
The vessel loaded the rolled steel coils at the Latvian port of Riga between 
February 26 and March 2, 1997. The vessel arrived at Camden, New Jersey, on March 
28, 1997. After departing from Camden, the vessel stopped at New Orleans and Houston. 
Steel Coils alleged that the cargo released in New Orleans and Houston was damaged by 
saltwater. This required Steel Coils to incur cleaning and re-coating costs associated with 
repairing the damaged cargo. Steel Coils filed suit under COGSA against the vessel in 
rem and against Lake Marion, Bay Ocean, and Western Bulk in personam, as well as a 
separate claim of negligence against Bay Ocean. The district court held defendant's 
jointly and severally liable to Steel Coils for $262,000, and Bay Ocean liable for an 
additional $243,358.94. 
The district court reviewed the bill of lading in determining the condition of the 
cargo at the time it was loaded onto the vessel. The court found that the bill of lading 
established prima facie evidence that the cargo was loaded in the condition· described 
therein. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). The district court 
rejected defendants Lake Marion, Bay Ocean, and the Vessel's claim that notations in the 
bill of lading, indicating rust staining and moisture on the rolled steal, established 
evidence that the cargo was damaged at the time it was loaded onto the vessel. The court 
properly considered facts indicating that the steel tested negative for saltwater residue at 
the port of loading. Moreover, an expert testified that the notations on the bill of lading 
indicating such blemishes were standard clauses used in the industry. The court weighed 
heavily on the holding in Thyssen, Inc. v. SIS Eurounity, 21 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1994). In 
Thyssen, the court concluded that notations on the bill of lading indicating rust and 
moisture were standard clauses that merely indicated normal atmospheric rust and not 
damaged steel. 
Defendants attempted to escape liability upon a showing that they exercised due 
diligence in making the vessel seaworthy. The court rejected this claim holding that 
defendants failed to adequately ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel. The evidence 
supported the conclusion that the vessel was not reasonably fit to perform the task of 
shipping steal coils. The vessel was not found to be reasonably fit for transporting steel 
because the hatch covers were not maintained in good condition resulting in an intrusion 
of seawater into the cargo hold during the voyage. Additionally, the court reasoned that 
it was a lack of due diligence to load steel into holds which previously carried a cargo of 
rock salt without washing such areas out with fresh water prior to loading the steel. 
The defendants unsuccessfully claimed that the terms of the voyage charter 
shifted the duty to exercise due diligence in ensuring the seaworthiness of the vessel. 
However, the court ruled that under COGSA carriers have the non-delegable duty to 
ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to perfom1 the task at hand. Jamaica Nutrition 
Holdings, L TD v. United Shipping Co. , 643 F.2d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 1981) ("COGSA 
grants freedom to contract out of its terms, but only in the direction of increasing the ship 
owner's liabilities.") Additionally, the defendants relied on J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. 
Sabine Howaldt, 437 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir. 1971), in alleging that the damage to the 
cargo was a result of rough conditions at sea. The district court rejected this defense 
asse1iing that evidence of fierce winds alone do not constitute a peril of the sea allowing a 
carrier to escape liability under COGSA. The court determined that since the vessel 
failed to sustain any damage due to the inclement weather, there is no basis for asserting 
such a defense. Steels Coils was also successful on a general maritime negligence claim 
against Bay Ocean. As to this negligence claim, the court ruled that Bay Ocean was not 
covered by the COGSA package limitation. 
In admiralty cases tried without a jury, an appellate court reviews the district 
court's legal conclusion de novo and the court's factual findings under the clearly 
erroneous standard. Sabah Shipyard Sdn. Bhd. v. MIV Harbel Tapper, 178 F.3d 400, 404 
(5th Cir. 1999). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that language in a bill of lading can be 
interpreted in accordance with customary usage. The court also decided that evidence at 
trial supported the finding that the defendants failed to exercise due diligence in ensuring 
the vessel was seaworthy. The court also determined that it was clearly established that 
the hatches of the vessel were not maintained in good condition prior to commencing the 
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transportation of the cargo. Moreover, evidence showed that the holds had previously 
contained a cargo of rock salt contributing to the damage affecting the present condition 
of the cargo. The court affirmed the lower court's holding that a carrier cannot delegate 
its duty to provide a seaworthy vessel to another party. Finally, the Court of Appeals felt 
that peril of the sea defense was not available to defendants based on the lower courts 
analysis. 
The court affirmed that Bay Ocean was not a carrier within the meaning of 
COGSA and therefore, was not entitled to its package limitation. In Sabah, the court 
stated that the determination of whether a party is classified as a carrier under COSGA 
focuses on whether that party executed a contract of carriage with the shipper. Under 
COGSA a party is classified as a "carrier" and thereby covered by the $500-per-package 
limitation on liability if that party executed a contract of carriage with the shipper. It is 
undisputed that Bay Ocean is not explicitly named in the voyage charter between 
Western Bulk and Steel Coils. Nevertheless, Bay Ocean maintained that since it was a 
party to the time charter between Lake Marion and Western Bulk, they should be 
considered a "carrier" within the meaning of COGSA. The Fifth Circuit found the 
voyage charter was the applicable contract of carriage. However, even if the time charter 
held any weight, it would still not save Bay Ocean because it merely acted as agent in the 
charter, as evidenced by the express language contained in the time charter contract. In 
Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp. ,  359 U.S. 297 (1956), the Supreme 
Court clarified that agents do not qualify for the $500-per-package limitation, 
determining that Congress did not intend to limit liability of "negligent agents of a 
carrier." !d. at 301. For the foregoing reasons the decision of the district court was 
affirn1ed. 
Frank M. Jenkins 
Class of 2004 
DEFINITIONS OF "SEAMAN" AND "VESSEL IN NAVIGATION" D EFINED 
UNDER THE JONES ACT 
The New York Supreme Court erred in denying summary judgment to defendant 
City of New York where plaintiff was not a "seaman" nor working on a "vessel in 
navigation" as defined by the Jones Act (46 U .S.C. § 688) . 
Orr v. City of New York 
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department 
304 A.D. 2d 541 
(Decided April 7, 2003) 
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant, City of New York ("City"), as a "marine 
oiler" or a "tankerman" at the St. George Terminal on Staten Island. Plaintiff was injured 
when he stepped off a gangplank onto a barge, where he slipped on oil. Plaintiff 
commenced action against the City pursuant to the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) which 
provided that "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his 
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